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
# **Internal Assessment Test 11- May 2017 SCHEME OF EVALUATION**

Sub:		]	Information	Network Secu	rity			Code:	10CS835
Date:	10/05/2017	Duration:	90 mins	Max Marks:	50	Sem:	VIII	Branch:	CSE

Note: : Answer any 5 questions


Total marks: 50

	Answer any 5 full questions		OI	BE
			СО	RBT
1	Explain in details the different security attacks? What are the difference between Active and Passive attacks  Security Attacks: Security attacks, used both in X.800 and RFC 2828, are classified as  a) passive attacks b)active attacks.  [Definition with types and diagram]  A passive attack attempts to learn or make use of information from the system but does not affect system resources.  Two types of passive attacks are release of message contents and traffic analysis.  1) Release of message Contents  Darth read contents of message from Bob to Alice  Alice  Alice  Alice	[10]	CO5	L4
	2) Traffic analysis.    Definition with types and diagrams			




(a) Masquerade

➤ **Replay** involves the passive capture of a data unit and its subsequent retransmission to produce an unauthorized effect




Modification of messages simply means that some portion of a legitimate message is altered, or that messages are delayed or reordered, to produce an unauthorized effect.



(c) Modification of messages

➤ The **denial of service** prevents or inhibits the normal use or management of communications facilities .This attack may have a specific target. Another form of service denial is the disruption of an entire network—either by disabling the network or by overloading it with messages so as to degrade performance.



(d) Denial of service

success, usually by means of because it requires physical protection of all communication facilities and paths at all times  Involves eavesdropping on, or Involve some modification of the	Passive Attacks	Active attacks	
not involve any alteration of data       detect         Measures are available to prevent their success, usually by means of encryption       Quite difficult to prevent absolutely because it requires physical protection of all communication facilities and paths at all times         Involves eavesdropping on, or monitoring of, transmission       Involve some modification of the data stream or the creation of a false stream         Two types → release of message contents and traffic analysis       Four categories → masquerade, replay, modification of messages and denial of service         Goal → prevention rather than detection       Goal → detect and recover from any disruption or delays caused by	It is indirect attack	It is direct attack	
success, usually by means of encryption  for all communication facilities and paths at all times  Involves eavesdropping on, or monitoring of, transmission  Two types → release of message contents and traffic analysis  Goal → prevention rather than detection  because it requires physical protection of all communication facilities and paths at all times  Involve some modification of the data stream or the creation of a false stream  Four categories → masquerade, replay, modification of messages and denial of service  Goal → detect and recover from any disruption or delays caused by		detect	
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message contents and traffic analysis replay, modification of messages and denial of service  Goal → prevention rather than detection Goal → detect and recover from any disruption or delays caused by	monitoring of, transmission	Involve some modification of the data stream or the creation of a false stream	
detection any disruption or delays caused by	message contents and traffic	replay, modification of messages and	
	-	any disruption or delays caused by	

#### AUTHENTICATION

The assurance that the communicating entity is the one that it claims to be.

#### Peer Entity Authentication

Used in association with a logical connection to provide confidence in the identity of the entities connected.

## **Data-Origin Authentication**

In a connectionless transfer, provides assurance that the source of received data is as claimed.

#### ACCESS CONTROL

The prevention of unauthorized use of a resource (i.e., this service controls who can have access to a resource, under what conditions access can occur, and what those accessing the resource are allowed to do).

#### DATA CONFIDENTIALITY

The protection of data from unauthorized disclosure.

#### **Connection Confidentiality**

The protection of all user data on a connection.

#### Connectionless Confidentiality

The protection of all user data in a single data block.

#### Selective-Field Confidentiality

The confidentiality of selected fields within the user data on a connection or in a single data block.

## Traffic-Flow Confidentiality

The protection of the information that might be derived from observation of traffic flows.

#### DATA INTEGRITY

The assurance that data received are exactly as sent by an authorized entity (i.e., contain no modification, insertion, deletion, or replay).

## Connection Integrity with Recovery

Provides for the integrity of all user data on a connection and detects any modification, insertion, deletion, or replay of any data within an entire data sequence, with recovery attempted.

## Connection Integrity without Recovery

As above, but provides only detection without recovery.

#### Selective-Field Connection Integrity

Provides for the integrity of selected fields within the user data of a data block transferred over a connection and takes the form of determination of whether the selected fields have been modified, inserted, deleted, or replayed.

## Connectionless Integrity

Provides for the integrity of a single connectionless data block and may take the form of detection of data modification. Additionally, a limited form of replay detection may be provided.

## Selective-Field Connectionless Integrity

Provides for the integrity of selected fields within a single connectionless data block; takes the form of determination of whether the selected fields have been modified.

## NONREPUDIATION

Provides protection against denial by one of the entities involved in a communication of having participated in all or part of the communication.

## Nonrepudiation, Origin

Proof that the message was sent by the specified party.

## Nonrepudiation, Destination

Proof that the message was received by the specified party.

There are 5 Security Mechanism each Carrie 1M]

5\*1=5M

	SPECIFIC SECURITY MECHANISMS	PERVASIVE SECURITY MECHANISMS		
	May be incorporated into the appropriate protocol layer in order to provide some of the OSI security services.	Mechanisms that are not specific to any particular OSI security service or protocol layer.		
		Trusted Functionality		
	The use of mathematical algorithms to transform	That which is perceived to be correct with respect to some criteria (e.g., as established by a security policy).		
	data into a form that is not readily intelligible. The			
	transformation and subsequent recovery of the data depend on an algorithm and zero or more	Security Label The marking bound to a resource (which may be a		
	encryption keys.	data unit) that names or designates the security		
	Digital Signature	attributes of that resource.		
	Data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation	Event Detection		
	of, a data unit that allows a recipient of the data unit to prove the source and integrity of the data unit and	Detection of security-relevant events.		
	protect against forgery (e.g., by the recipient).	Security Audit Trail		
	Access Control	Data collected and potentially used to facilitate a security audit, which is an independent review and		
	A variety of mechanisms that enforce access rights to	examination of system records and activities.		
	resources.			
	Data Integrity	Security Recovery Deals with requests from mechanisms, such as event		
	A variety of mechanisms used to assure the integrity of a data unit or stream of data units.	handling and management functions, and takes recovery actions.		
		recovery actions.		
	Authentication Exchange A mechanism intended to ensure the identity of an			
	entity by means of information exchange.			
	Traffic Padding			
	The insertion of bits into gaps in a data stream to			
	frustrate traffic analysis attempts.			
	Routing Control			
	Enables selection of particular physically secure routes for certain data and allows routing changes,			
	especially when a breach of security is suspected.			
	Notarization			
	The use of a trusted third party to assure certain properties of a data exchange.			
	properties of a data exchange.			
	th the neat diagram explain the Kerberos			
E	CRBEROS	[Definition 2 M]		
<b>E</b>	beros is a key distribution and user authen	_		
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Err ree reer	beros is a key distribution and user authenticular, the following three threats exist:  A user may gain access to a particular was rating from that workstation.  A user may alter the network address of a wared workstation appear to come from the in user may eavesdrop on exchanges and us to disrupt operations. Kerberos provides ction is to authenticate users to servers and symmetric encryption, making no use of pure rberos Version 4  The sion 4 of Kerberos makes use of DES, in a rathentication service.  A Simple Authentication Dialogue	rorkstation and pretend to be another user vorkstation so that the requests sent from the impersonated workstation.  e a replay attack to gain entrance to a server a centralized authentication server whose diservers to users. Kerberos relies exclusively blic-key encryption.  ather elaborate protocol, to provide the impersonated workstation.	[10]	CO6

- ✓ To counter this threat, servers must be able to confirm the identities of clients who request service.
- ✓ An alternative is to use an **authentication server (AS)** that knows the passwords of all users and stores these in a centralized database.

(1) 
$$C \rightarrow AS$$
:  $ID_C ||P_C||ID_V$ 

(3) 
$$C \rightarrow V$$
:  $ID_C \parallel Ticket$ 

$$Ticket = E(K_v, [ID_C || AD_C || ID_V])$$

n this scenario, the user logs on to a workstation and requests access to server V.

- The client module C in the user's workstation requests the user's password and then sends a message to the AS that includes the user's ID, the server's ID, and the user's password.
- The AS checks its database to see if the user has supplied the proper password for this user ID and whether this user is permitted access to server V.
- If both tests are passed, the AS accepts the user as authentic and must now convince the server that this user is authentic.
- To do so, the AS creates a **ticket** that contains the user's ID and network address and the server's ID.
- This ticket is encrypted using the secret key shared by the AS and this server.
- This ticket is then sent back to C.
- Because the ticket is encrypted, it cannot be altered by C or by an opponent.
- With this ticket, C can now apply to V for service.
- C sends a message to V containing C's ID and the ticket.
- V decrypts the ticket and verifies that the user ID in the ticket is the same as the unencrypted user ID in the message.
- If these two match, the server considers the user authenticated and grants the requested service.

# [Message Exchange 4M]

# Once per user logon session:

(1) 
$$C \rightarrow AS$$
:  $ID_C \parallel ID_{tes}$ 

(2) AS 
$$\rightarrow$$
 C:  $E(K_c, Ticket_{tes})$ 

# Once per type of service:


(3) 
$$C \rightarrow TGS$$
:  $ID_C || ID_V || Ticket_{tes}$ 

# Once per service session:


$$Ticket_{tgs} = \mathbb{E}(K_{tgs}, [ID_C || AD_C || ID_{tgs} || TS_1 || Lifetime_1])$$

$$Ticket_v = \mathbb{E}(K_v, [ID_C || AD_C || ID_v || TS_2 || Lifetime_2])$$

[Diagram with Explanation 4 M]



Explain the general format of a X.509 public key certificate



CO6

L4

Figure 4.4 X.509 Formats

4a

- **Version:** Differentiates among successive versions of the certificate format; the default is version 1. If the Issuer Unique Identifier or Subject Unique Identifier are present, the value must be version 2. If one or more extensions are present, the version must be version 3.
- **Serial number:** An integer value, unique within the issuing CA, that is unambiguously associated with this certificate.
- **Signature algorithm identifier:** The algorithm used to sign the certificate, together with any associated parameters. Because this information is repeated in the Signature field at the end of the certificate, this field has little, if any, utility.
- **Issuer name:** X.500 name of the CA that created and signed this certificate.
- **Period of validity:** Consists of two dates: the first and last on which the certificate is valid. **Subject name:** The name of the user to whom this certificate refers. That is, this certificate certifies the public key of the subject who holds the corresponding private key. **Subject's public-key information:** The public key of the subject, plus an identifier of the

algorithm for which this key is to be used, together with any associated parameters. • Issuer unique identifier: An optional bit string field used to identify uniquely the issuing CA in the event the X.500 name has been reused for different entities. • Subject unique identifier: An optional bit string field used to identify uniquely the subject in the event the X.500 name has been reused for different entities. • Extensions: A set of one or more extension fields. Extensions were added in version 3 and are discussed later in this section. • Signature: Covers all of the other fields of the certificate; it contains the hash code of the other fields encrypted with the CA's private key. This field includes the signature algorithm identifier. Explain the different Authentication procedures of X.509 4b [Diagram with Explanation Each Carries 1M] 3\*1=3M 1. A $\{t_A, r_A, ID_B, sgnData, E[PU_b, K_{ab}]\}$ A В (a) One-way authentication 1. A $\{t_A, r_A, ID_B, sgnData, E[PU_b, K_{ab}]\}$ 2. B $\{t_B, r_B, ID_A, r_A, \text{sgnData}, E[PU_a, K_{ba}]\}$ B (b) Two-way authentication 1. A $\{t_A, r_A, ID_B, \text{sgnData}, E[PU_b, K_{ab}]\}$ 2. B $\{t_B, r_B, ID_A, r_A, \text{sgnData}, E[PU_a, K_{ba}]\}$ [03] CO6 L4 B 3. A $\{r_B\}$ (c) Three-way authentication alternative authentication procedures: One-Way Authentication Two-Way Authentication Three-Way Authentication All use public-key signatures. **One-way Authentication** 1 message (A->B) used to establish o the identity of A and that message is from A o message was intended for B o integrity & originality of message **Two-way Authentication** 2 messages (A->B, B->A) which also establishes in addition: o the identity of B and that reply is from B o that reply is intended for A o integrity & originality of reply

Three-way Authentication  3 messages (A->B, B->A, A->B) which enables above authentication without synchronized clocks  5a Describe PGP Message Generation from user A and user B with a block schematic diagram?  [Diagram with Explanation of steps 4M+2M]  3+4=6M			
Message  Figure 5.5 PGP Message Generation (from User A to User B: no compression or radix 64 conversion)  The sending PGP entity performs the  following steps:	[06]	CO6	L2
Signing the message:  a.) PEP retrieves the sender's private key from the a.) PEP retrieves the sender's private key from the pour user'd as an index.  The your user'd is not provided in the command, the first private key on the ring is retrieved.  b.) PEP prompts the user for the passphrase to recover the unencrypted private key.  c.) the signature component of the message is constructed.			

	2. Encoypting the message.  a) PGP generates a session key and encoypts.  the message.  b.) PGP refrieves the recipient's public key from the public-lay ring using her-userid as an index.  c) The session key component of the message is constructed.			
5b	What is S/MIME? Mentions the functions provided by S/MIME  [Definition carries 1M]  SIMIME IS a Security enhancement to  SIMIME Internet email format standard,  the MIME Internet email format standard,  tased on technology from RSA data  Security.  > S   MIME WILL emerge as the industry standard  for commercial and organizational use.  > PGP WILL remain the choice for personal  e-mail security for many users.			
	[Mention any 3 Function each carries 1M]  3*1=3M  ** similar provides the following functions.  Denveloped Data: Consists of Encrypted Contents  and encrypted session keys for recipients.  Signed Data: A digital signature is formed by taking the message digest of the content to be signed and them encrypting that the with the private key of the signer.  Clear-signed Data: Signed, but not encrypted.  Signed and Enveloped Data: Signed-only and encrypted-only antities may be nested, so that encrypted data may be signed and signed obta or clear-signed data may be encrypted.	[04]	CO6	L1
6	What are the five principal services provided by PGP? Explain the operational description of PGP?  [Diagram with Explanation 5 Operation each Carries 2M] 5*2=10M	[10]	CO6	L1

1. Authentication.		
2. confidentiality		
3. Compression.		
4. Email compatibility.		
5. Segmentation.		

