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## Internal Assessment Test 1 – May. 2022

| Sub:  | Network Secur                  | ity       |          |            |    | Sub Code:  | 18EC821        | Branch: | ECE |     |     |
|-------|--------------------------------|-----------|----------|------------|----|------------|----------------|---------|-----|-----|-----|
| Date: | 14-05-22                       | Duration: | 90 min's | Max Marks: | 50 | Sem / Sec: | 8 – A, B, C, D |         |     | OBI | Е   |
|       | Answer any FIVE FULL Questions |           |          |            |    |            |                | MA      | RKS | CO  | RBT |

| 1. | Explain the need for security, and also write a note on modern nature of attacks.  | [10] | CO1 | L2 |
|----|--|------|-----|----|
| 2. | Describe the following: Confidentiality, Authentication, Integrity, Non-repudiation, Availability as applied to network security | [10] | CO1 | L2 |
| 3. | Discuss the Passive and Active attacks in detail.  | [10] | CO1 | L2 |
| 4. | Infer on web traffic security approaches.  | [10] | CO2 | L2 |
| 5. | Differentiate between SSL Connection and SSL Session?  | [10] | CO2 | L2 |
| 6. | Illustrate SSL Handshake Protocol Action with neat diagram.  | [10] | CO2 | L3 |
| 7. | Explain Pseudorandom Function and Alert Codes in TLS.  | [10] | CO2 | L2 |
| 8. | Briefly explain HTTPS, connection initiation and connection closure in HTTPS.  | [10] | CO2 | L1 |

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| Sub:                                 | Network Secur | ity       |          |            |    | Sub Code:  | 18EC821 | Branch: | ECE |    |    |
|--------------------------------------|---------------|-----------|----------|------------|----|------------|---------|---------|-----|----|----|
| Date:                                | 14-05-22      | Duration: | 90 min's | Max Marks: | 50 | Sem / Sec: | 8-A     | B, C, D |     | Ol | BE |
| Answer any FIVE FULL Questions MARKS |               |           |          |            |    |            |         | CO      | RBT |    |    |


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|----|--|------|-----|----|
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Internal Assesment Test – I MAY 2022

| internal respondent rest in 1911 2022            |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|--|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Sub:   | Sub: Network Security Code: 18EC821   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Date:  | Date:         14/05/2022         Duration:         90 mins         Max Marks:         50         Sem:         8         Branch:         ECE |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Answer any five questions out of eight questions |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| SCHEME OF VALUATION                              |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

| began to gain prominence. Two typical examples of such security mechanisms were as follows:  • Provide a user identification and password to every user, and use that information to authenticate a user.  • Encode information stored in the databases in some fashion, so that it is not visible to users who do not have the right permission.  a. Automating Attacks b. Privacy Concerns c. Distance Does not Matter  6M.  Confidentiality, Authentication, Integrity, Non-repudiation   | Q. | Questions  | Marks  |
|--|----|--|--------|
| Most previous computer applications had no, or at best, very little security. This continued for a number of years until the importance of data was truly realized. Until then, computer data was considered to be useful, but not something to be protected. When computer applications were developed to handle financial and personal data, the real need for security was felt like never before. People realized that data on computers is an externelly important aspect of modern life. Therefore, various areas in security began to gain prominence. Two typical examples of such security mechanisms were as follows:  • Provide a user identification and password to every user, and use that information to authenticate a user.  • Encode information stored in the databases in some fashion, so that it is not visible to users who do not have the right permission.  a. Automating Attacks b. Privacy Concerns c. Distance Does not Matter   Confidentiality, Authentication, Integrity, Non-repudiation  Confidentiality, Authentication, Integrity, Non-repudiation  Authentication  4x2=i | no |  |        |
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| b. Privacy Concerns c. Distance Does not Matter   6M  Confidentiality, Authentication, Integrity, Non-repudiation  Confidentiality  Authentication  4x2=1  | 1. | of years until the importance of data was truly realized. Until then, computer data was considered to be useful, but not something to be protected. When computer applications were developed to handle financial and personal data, the real need for security was felt like never before. People realized that data on computers is an extremely important aspect of modern life. Therefore, various areas in security began to gain prominence. Two typical examples of such security mechanisms were as follows:  • Provide a user identification and password to every user, and use that information to authenticate a user.  • Encode information stored in the databases in some fashion, so that it is not visible to users who | 4M     |
| b. Privacy Concerns c. Distance Does not Matter  6M  Confidentiality, Authentication, Integrity, Non-repudiation  Confidentiality  Authentication  4x2=1   |    | a. Automating Attacks  |        |
| 2. Confidentiality, Authentication, Integrity, Non-repudiation  Confidentiality  Authentication  4x2=6   |    | -  |        |
| 2. Confidentiality, Authentication, Integrity, Non-repudiation  Confidentiality  Authentication  Authentication  Authentication  4x2=1   |    | c. Distance Does not Matter  |        |
| Confidentiality  Authentication  4x2=1  Transfer \$ 100 to D  Actual route of the message which you claim to have  |    |  | 6M     |
| Confidentiality  Authentication  4x2=5  Transfer \$ 1000 to D Actual route of the message which you claim to have  | 2. | Confidentiality, Authentication, Integrity, Non-repudiation  |        |
| Transfer \$ 100 to D  Actual route of the message  Transfer \$ 1000 to D  Actual route of the message Transfer \$ 1000 to D  Transfer \$ 1000 to D  Transfer \$ 1000 to D  |    | Solici Mall  |        |
| Transfer \$ 100 to D  Actual route of the message Transfer \$ 1000 to C  I never sent that message, which you claim to have  |    | Confidentiality Authentication   | 4x2=8M |
| Integrity Non-repudiation  |    | Transfer \$ 1000 to D  Actual route of the message  C  Actual route of the message  Transfer \$ 1000 to C  Actual route of the message, which you claim to have received   |        |
|  |    | •  | 2M     |



|    |                      | nes a set of security par       |   |    |  |  |
|----|----------------------|---------------------------------|---|----|--|--|
|    | 1                    | be shared by multiple           |   |    |  |  |
|    |                      | -                               | e negotiations of security parameters for   |    |  |  |
|    | each o               | connection. Single sessi        | on has many connections. Every  |    |  |  |
|    | conne                | ction has a different ke        | y   |    |  |  |
|    |                      | Client                          | Server  |    |  |  |
|    | client_hello Phase 1 |                                 |   |    |  |  |
|    |                      | 2440                            | Phase 1 Establish security capabilities, including  |    |  |  |
|    |                      | hallo                           | protocol version, session ID, cipher suite,<br>compression method, and initial random     |    |  |  |
|    |                      | server_hello                    | numbers.  |    |  |  |
|    | _                    |                                 |   |    |  |  |
|    |                      | centificate                     |   |    |  |  |
|    |                      |                                 |   |    |  |  |
|    |                      | server_key_exchange             | Phase 2   |    |  |  |
|    |                      | certificate_request_            | Server may send certificate, key exchange,<br>and request certificate. Server signals end |    |  |  |
|    |                      |                                 | of hello message phase.   |    |  |  |
|    |                      | server_hello_done               |   |    |  |  |
|    |                      | 4                               |   |    |  |  |
|    | Time                 | certificate                     |   |    |  |  |
| 6. |                      |                                 | nı 2  |    |  |  |
|    | ↓ ↓                  | client_key_exchange             | Phase 3 Client sends certificate if requested. Client                                     | 6M |  |  |
|    | ,                    |                                 | sends key exchange. Client may send certificate verification.                             |    |  |  |
|    |                      | centificate_verify              | certificate verification.   |    |  |  |
|    | _                    |                                 | <b>*</b>  |    |  |  |
|    |                      | change_cipher_spec              |   |    |  |  |
|    |                      |                                 |   |    |  |  |
|    |                      | finished                        |   |    |  |  |
|    |                      |                                 | Phase 4 Change cipher suite and finish  |    |  |  |
|    |                      | change_cipher_spec              | handshake protocol.   |    |  |  |
|    |                      | 4                               |   |    |  |  |
|    |                      | finished                        |   |    |  |  |
|    | _                    | 4                               |   |    |  |  |
|    |                      |                                 | Note: Shaded transfers are  |    |  |  |
|    |                      |                                 | optional or situation-dependent<br>messages that are not always sent.                     |    |  |  |
|    |                      | Handshake Protocol Action       |   |    |  |  |
|    |                      | COL II . I I I B                | · M · T   |    |  |  |
|    |                      | Message Type                    | otocol Message Types Parameters   |    |  |  |
|    |                      | hello_request                   | null  |    |  |  |
|    |                      | client_hello                    | version, random, session id, cipher suite, compression method                             |    |  |  |
|    |                      | server_hello                    | version, random, session id, cipher suite, compression method                             |    |  |  |
|    |                      | certificate server_key_exchange | chain of X.509v3 certificates parameters, signature                                       | 4M |  |  |
|    |                      | certificate_request             | type, authorities   |    |  |  |
|    |                      | server_done                     | null  |    |  |  |
|    |                      | certificate_verify              | signature   |    |  |  |
|    |                      | client_key_exchange             | parameters, signature   |    |  |  |
|    |                      | finished                        | hash value  |    |  |  |

| 7. | Alert Codes   |     |
|----|---|-----|
|    | TLS supports all of the alert codes defined in SSLv3 with the exception of no_certificate. A number of additional codes are defined in TLS; of these, the following are always fatal.   |     |
|    | <ul> <li>record_overflow: A TLS record was received with a payload (ciphertext) whose length exceeds 2<sup>14</sup>+2048 bytes, or the ciphertext decrypted to a length of greater than 2<sup>14</sup>+1024 bytes.</li> </ul>                           |     |
|    | <ul> <li>unknown_ca: A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not be located or could not be matched with a known, trusted CA.</li> </ul>                         |     |
|    | <ul> <li>access_denied: A valid certificate was received, but when access control was applied, the sender decided not to proceed with the negotiation.</li> </ul>   |     |
|    | <ul> <li>decode_error: A message could not be decoded, because either a field<br/>was out of its specified range or the length of the message was incorrect.</li> </ul>   |     |
|    | <ul> <li>protocol_version: The protocol version the client attempted to negotiate is recognized but not supported.</li> </ul>   |     |
|    | <ul> <li>insufficient_security: Returned instead of handshake_failure when a negotiation has failed specifically because the server requires ciphers more secure than those supported by the client.</li> </ul>   | 10M |
|    | <ul> <li>unsupported_extension: Sent by clients that receive an extended server<br/>hello containing an extension not in the corresponding client hello.</li> </ul>   |     |
|    | <ul> <li>internal_error: An internal error unrelated to the peer or the correctness of the protocol makes it impossible to continue.</li> </ul>   |     |
|    | <ul> <li>decrypt_error: A handshake cryptographic operation failed, including<br/>being unable to verify a signature, decrypt a key exchange, or validate a fin-<br/>ished message.</li> </ul>  |     |
|    | <ul> <li>user_canceled: This handshake is being canceled for some reason unre-<br/>lated to a protocol failure.</li> </ul>  |     |
|    | <ul> <li>no_renegotiation: Sent by a client in response to a hello request or by<br/>the server in response to a client hello after initial handshaking. Either<br/>of these messages would normally result in renegotiation, but this alert</li> </ul> |     |
|    | indicates that the sender is not able to renegotiate. This message is always a warning.   |     |
| 8. | HTTPS (HTTP over SSL) refers to the combination of HTTP and SSL to imple-   |     |
|    | ment secure communication between a Web browser and a Web server. The HTTPS capability is built into all modern Web browsers. Its use depends on the Web server   |     |
|    | supporting HTTPS communication. For example, search engines do not support HTTPS.   |     |
|    | The principal difference seen by a user of a Web browser is that URL (uniform resource locator) addresses begin with https:// rather than http://. A normal   |     |
|    | HTTP connection uses port 80. If HTTPS is specified, port 443 is used, which invokes SSL.   |     |
|    | When HTTPS is used, the following elements of the communication are encrypted:  | 2M  |
|    | <ul> <li>URL of the requested document</li> </ul>   |     |
|    | <ul> <li>Contents of the document</li> </ul>  |     |
|    | <ul> <li>Contents of browser forms (filled in by browser user)</li> </ul>   |     |
|    | <ul> <li>Cookies sent from browser to server and from server to browser</li> <li>Contents of HTTP header</li> </ul>   |     |
|    |   |     |

## Connection Initiation

For HTTPS, the agent acting as the HTTP client also acts as the TLS client. The client initiates a connection to the server on the appropriate port and then sends the TLS ClientHello to begin the TLS handshake. When the TLS handshake has finished, the client may then initiate the first HTTP request. All HTTP data is to be sent as TLS application data. Normal HTTP behavior, including retained connections, should be followed.

We need to be clear that there are three levels of awareness of a connection in HTTPS. At the HTTP level, an HTTP client requests a connection to an HTTP server by sending a connection request to the next lowest layer. Typically, the next lowest layer is TCP, but it also may be TLS/SSL. At the level of TLS, a session is established between a TLS client and a TLS server. This session can support one or more connections at any time. As we have seen, a TLS request to establish a connection begins with the establishment of a TCP connection between the TCP entity on the client side and the TCP entity on the server side.

## Connection Closure

An HTTP client or server can indicate the closing of a connection by including the following line in an HTTP record: Connection: close. This indicates that the connection will be closed after this record is delivered.

The closure of an HTTPS connection requires that TLS close the connection with the peer TLS entity on the remote side, which will involve closing the underlying TCP connection. At the TLS level, the proper way to close a connection is for each side to use the TLS alert protocol to send a close\_notify alert. TLS implementations must initiate an exchange of closure alerts before closing a connection. A TLS implementation may, after sending a closure alert, close the connection without waiting for the peer to send its closure alert, generating an "incomplete close". Note that an implementation that does this may choose to reuse the session. This should only be done when the application knows (typically through detecting HTTP message boundaries) that it has received all the message data that it cares about.

HTTP clients also must be able to cope with a situation in which the underlying TCP connection is terminated without a prior close\_notify alert and without a Connection: close indicator. Such a situation could be due to a programming

4M

4M