


Internal Assesment Test – I MAY 2022

Sub:	Network Security							Code:	18EC821
Date:	14/05/2022	Duration:	90 mins	Max Marks:	50	Sem:	8	Branch:	ECE
Answer any five questions out of eight questions									
SCHEME OF VALUATION									

Transfer \$ 100 Lo D Actual route of the message Transfer \$ 100 Lo D Actual rou	Q.	Questions	Marks
Most previous computer applications had no, or at best, very little security. This continued for a number of years until the importance of data was runs levelized. Until then, computer data was considered to be useful, but not something to be protected. When computer applications were developed to handle financial and personal data, the real need for security was felt like never before. People realized that data on computers is an extremely important aspect of modem life. Therefore, various areas in security began to gain prominence. Two typical examples of such security mechanisms were as follows: • Provide a user identification and password to every user, and use that information to authenticate a user. • Encode information stored in the databases in some fashion, so that it is not visible to users who do not have the right permission. a. Automating Attacks b. Privacy Concerns c. Distance Does not Matter Confidentiality, Authentication, Integrity, Non-repudiation Confidentiality, Authentication, Integrity, Non-repudiation 4x2=8.	no		
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b. Privacy Concerns c. Distance Does not Matter Substance Does not Matter Substance Substance Does not Matter Substance Does not Matt	1.	of years until the importance of data was truly realized. Until then, computer data was considered to be useful, but not something to be protected. When computer applications were developed to handle financial and personal data, the real need for security was felt like never before. People realized that data on computers is an extremely important aspect of modern life. Therefore, various areas in security began to gain prominence. Two typical examples of such security mechanisms were as follows: • Provide a user identification and password to every user, and use that information to authenticate a user. • Encode information stored in the databases in some fashion, so that it is not visible to users who	4M
b. Privacy Concerns c. Distance Does not Matter 6M Confidentiality, Authentication, Integrity, Non-repudation Confidentiality Authentication 4x2=8.		a. Automating Attacks	
2. Confidentiality, Authentication, Integrity, Non-repudiation Confidentiality Authentication 4x2=8:		-	
2. Confidentiality, Authentication, Integrity, Non-repudiation Confidentiality Authentication 4x2=8.		c. Distance Does not Matter	
Confidentiality Authentication 4x2=8			6M
Confidentiality Authentication 4x2=8	2.	Confidentiality, Authentication, Integrity, Non-repudiation	
Transfer \$ 100 to D Actual route of the message Actual route of the message Transfer \$ 100 to D Actual route of the message Actual route of the message Transfer \$ 1000 to C Actual route of the message B I never sent that message, which you claim to have received B		Source A I A I A I A I A I A I A I A I A I A	
Transfer \$ 1000 to D Actual route of the message Transfer \$ 1000 to C Actual route of the message Actual route of the message Transfer \$ 1000 to C A I never sent that message, which you claim to have received B		Confidentiality Authentication	4x2=8M
Integrity Non-repudiation		Transfer \$ 100 to D Actual route of the message Actual route of the message which you claim to have	
Confidentiality, Authentication, Integrity, Non-repudiation (Explaination) 2M		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	2M



		nes a set of security pa					
	It may be shared by multiple SSL connections.						
		It is useful to avoid expensive negotiations of security parameters for					
			on has many connections. Every				
	conne	ction has a different ke	ey				
	Client Server						
		Phase 1					
		client_hello	Establish security capabilities, including				
		server_hello	protocol version, session ID, cipher suite, compression method, and initial random				
		server	numbers.				
	_						
		certificate		6M			
		server_key_exchange					
			Phase 2 Server may send certificate, key exchange,				
		certificate_request	and request certificate. Server signals end of hello message phase.				
		server_hello_done	of hello message phase.				
		server_nerro_					
	Time	certificate					
6.		client_key_exchange	Phase 3				
0.	*		Client sends certificate if requested. Client sends key exchange. Client may send				
		certificate_verify	certificate verification.				
			—				
		change_cipher_spec					
		finished					
			Phase 4 Change cipher suite and finish				
		change_cipher_spec	handshake protocol.				
		4					
		finished					
	_	4					
			Note: Shaded transfers are				
			optional or situation-dependent messages that are not always sent.				
		Handshake Protocol Action					
		SSL Handshake Pro	otocol Message Types				
		Message Type	Parameters				
		hello_request client_hello	null version, random, session id, cipher suite, compression method				
		server hello	version, random, session id, cipher suite, compression method				
		certificate	chain of X.509v3 certificates	4 7 7			
		server_key_exchange	parameters, signature	4M			
		certificate_request server_done	type, authorities null				
		certificate_verify	signature				
		client_key_exchange	parameters, signature				
		finished	hash value				

7.	Alert Codes	
	TLS supports all of the alert codes defined in SSLv3 with the exception of no_certificate. A number of additional codes are defined in TLS; of these, the following are always fatal.	
	 record_overflow: A TLS record was received with a payload (ciphertext) whose length exceeds 2¹⁴+2048 bytes, or the ciphertext decrypted to a length of greater than 2¹⁴+1024 bytes. 	
	 unknown_ca: A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not be located or could not be matched with a known, trusted CA. 	
	 access_denied: A valid certificate was received, but when access control was applied, the sender decided not to proceed with the negotiation. 	
	 decode_error: A message could not be decoded, because either a field was out of its specified range or the length of the message was incorrect. 	
	 protocol_version: The protocol version the client attempted to negotiate is recognized but not supported. 	
	 insufficient_security: Returned instead of handshake_failure when a negotiation has failed specifically because the server requires ciphers more secure than those supported by the client. 	10M
	 unsupported_extension: Sent by clients that receive an extended server hello containing an extension not in the corresponding client hello. 	
	 internal_error: An internal error unrelated to the peer or the correctness of the protocol makes it impossible to continue. 	
	 decrypt_error: A handshake cryptographic operation failed, including being unable to verify a signature, decrypt a key exchange, or validate a fin- ished message. 	
	 user_canceled: This handshake is being canceled for some reason unre- lated to a protocol failure. 	
	 no_renegotiation: Sent by a client in response to a hello request or by the server in response to a client hello after initial handshaking. Either of these messages would normally result in renegotiation, but this alert 	
	indicates that the sender is not able to renegotiate. This message is always a warning.	
8.	HTTPS (HTTP over SSL) refers to the combination of HTTP and SSL to imple-	
	ment secure communication between a Web browser and a Web server. The HTTPS capability is built into all modern Web browsers. Its use depends on the Web server	
	supporting HTTPS communication. For example, search engines do not support HTTPS.	
	The principal difference seen by a user of a Web browser is that URL (uniform resource locator) addresses begin with https:// rather than http://. A normal HTTP connection uses port 80. If HTTPS is specified, port 443 is used, which invokes SSL.	
	When HTTPS is used, the following elements of the communication are encrypted:	2M
	URL of the requested document	
	 Contents of the document 	
	 Contents of browser forms (filled in by browser user) 	
	 Cookies sent from browser to server and from server to browser Contents of HTTP header 	

Connection Initiation

For HTTPS, the agent acting as the HTTP client also acts as the TLS client. The client initiates a connection to the server on the appropriate port and then sends the TLS ClientHello to begin the TLS handshake. When the TLS handshake has finished, the client may then initiate the first HTTP request. All HTTP data is to be sent as TLS application data. Normal HTTP behavior, including retained connections, should be followed.

We need to be clear that there are three levels of awareness of a connection in HTTPS. At the HTTP level, an HTTP client requests a connection to an HTTP server by sending a connection request to the next lowest layer. Typically, the next lowest layer is TCP, but it also may be TLS/SSL. At the level of TLS, a session is established between a TLS client and a TLS server. This session can support one or more connections at any time. As we have seen, a TLS request to establish a connection begins with the establishment of a TCP connection between the TCP entity on the client side and the TCP entity on the server side.

Connection Closure

An HTTP client or server can indicate the closing of a connection by including the following line in an HTTP record: Connection: close. This indicates that the connection will be closed after this record is delivered.

The closure of an HTTPS connection requires that TLS close the connection with the peer TLS entity on the remote side, which will involve closing the underlying TCP connection. At the TLS level, the proper way to close a connection is for each side to use the TLS alert protocol to send a close_notify alert. TLS implementations must initiate an exchange of closure alerts before closing a connection. A TLS implementation may, after sending a closure alert, close the connection without waiting for the peer to send its closure alert, generating an "incomplete close". Note that an implementation that does this may choose to reuse the session. This should only be done when the application knows (typically through detecting HTTP message boundaries) that it has received all the message data that it cares about.

HTTP clients also must be able to cope with a situation in which the underlying TCP connection is terminated without a prior close_notify alert and without a Connection: close indicator. Such a situation could be due to a programming

4M

4M